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KISS THE RING, BUT NEVER TOUCH THE CROWN: HOW
U.S. POLICY DENIES INDIAN WOMEN BODILY
AUTONOMY AND THE SAVE NATIVE WOMEN ACT'S
ATTEMPT TO REVERSE THAT POLICY
Hossein Dabiri*
I. Introduction
Gender violence is a silent crisis affecting many women in Indian
Country. One third of Indian women are raped and three out of every five
Indian women are assaulted by a partner.' Police routinely triage rape and
sexual assault cases.2 What is more, law enforcement and social services
agencies designed to help these women in the aftermath of such violence
lack the administrative freedom required to be effective.'
Gender violence certainly exists outside of Indian Country in myriad
forms. But the causes and effects of this violence seem to be distinct in
Indian Country. Many have argued that violence by non-Indians against
Indians can be attributed to a jurisdictional "black hole."" Although a lack
of jurisdiction may be a variable that permits gender violence to go
unpunished in Indian Country, it is neither the alpha nor the omega of the
gender violence occurring in Indian Country.5 Gender violence directed
against Native people, and the silence surrounding it, is part and parcel a
byproduct of colonization.6
* University of Oklahoma College of Law, J.D. May 2012; University of Oklahoma,
B.A. 2009. Many thanks to the fabulous staff and editors of AILR and to Lori Murphy, Mary
Huckabee, and Paige Hoster whose feedback and encouragement made this Comment
possible.
1. Statement of Associate Attorney General Thomas J Perrelli, Before the Committee
on Indian Affairs on Violence Against Native American Women, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. (July
14, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/asg/speeches/201 1/asg-speech- 110714.html
[hereinafter Perrelli Statement]
2. See id.
3. See id. (detailing the institutional failings in this regard).
4. See generally Marie Quasius, Native American Rape Victims: Desperately Seeking
an Oliphant-Fix, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1902 (2009); Laura E. Pisarello, Lawless By Design:
Jurisdiction, Gender and Justice in Indian Country, 59 EMORY L.J. 1515 (2010); Rebecca A.
Hart, No Exceptions Made: Sexual Assault Against Native American Women and the Denial
ofReproductive Healthcare Services, 25 Wis. J.L. GENDER & Soc'y 209 (2010).
5. See generally Sarah Deer, Sovereignty of the Soul: Exploring the Intersection of
Rape Law Reform and Federal Indian Law, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 455 (2005) [hereinafter
Deer, Sovereignty of the Soul].
6. See Part II.C.
385
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2012
AMERICAN INDIAN LA WREVIEW
Gender violence against Indian people aims to degrade the Indian body,
erode tribal sovereignty, and assimilate Indian culture. Within Indian
Country, opaque jurisdictional rules paralyze law enforcement.8 Courts
addressing such problems are consistently hamstrung by the courts of
another jurisdiction.9  Perpetrators go free. Victims remain without
vindication.
This, however, is only half the story. The impacts of gender violence do
not end when the perpetrator leaves. Rape, specifically, "is laden with
psychological and spiritual ramifications."' 0 Rape is a lived experienced."
Rape survivors could provide excellent insight into how rape incidents are
perceived and managed in their particular communities. Legislation
addressing rape and other forms of gender violence need to be consonant
with those stories.
This comment addresses two legal issues relating to gender violence
against Indian women: criminal jurisdiction and civil jurisdiction. These
issues will be presented against the backdrop of proposed legislation, the
Stand Against Violence and Empower Native Women Act ("SAVE").12
This comment will test the effects that the proposed SAVE legislation
might have on the gender-related problems occurring inside Indian Country.
SAVE seeks to ameliorate gender violence against Indian women,
employing tribal sovereignty as its galvanizing tool.' 3  This comment
argues that SAVE, if passed, will effectively strengthen tribal sovereignty.
But SAVE will likely be a mere palliative remedy for Native women,
failing to resolve the larger systemic issues responsible for the crisis-level
rates of gender violence. Absent comprehensive action that addresses the
causes and effects of violence against Native women, piecemeal legislation,
such as SAVE, will not significantly mitigate violence against Native
women.
A fundamental reconfiguration of self-government by Indian nations -
not "as primarily the administration of a jurisdictional grid" but as "lived
connections to land and one's people" - is required to effect substantial
7. ANDREA SMITH, CONQUEST: SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND AMERICAN INDIAN GENOCIDE 7-
8 (2005) [hereinafter SMITH, CONQUEST].
8. Perrelli Statement, supra note 1 ("In short, the jurisdictional framework has left
many serious acts of domestic violence and dating violence unprosecuted and unpunished.").
9. See discussion infra Part III(e)(ii).
10. Sarah Deer, Toward an Indigenous Jurisprudence of Rape, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 121, 123 (2004-2005) [hereinafter Deer, Indigenous Jurisprudence].
11. Id. at 138.





change in Native peoples' daily lives.14 Native sovereigns must respond to
Native peoples' unique needs, regardless of whether those people are
wholly within the territorial boundaries of that Indian nation. This
comment concludes that SAVE does increase powers available to tribal
judicial systems, but falls short of providing essential services to ameliorate
gender violence and its effects in Indian Country.
Before delving into this comment's substance, it is important to address
distinctions in terminology. This comment uses the term "gender violence"
to refer to all forms of violence directed toward an individual based on
gender. Sexual violence goes beyond "individual acts of rape - rather it
encompasses a wide range of strategies designed not only to destroy
peoples, but to destroy their sense of being a people."15
Gender violence perpetrators often act to reinforce patriarchal norms
against both men and women. 16 Hatred of the feminine, or misogyny, can
be directed at anyone regardless of sex.' 7 Too often, misogynistic violence
directed at men is discredited because the victim's sex blurs the gender-
based reasons for the attack (e.g. perpetrators attack male victims for
exhibiting feminine gender qualities).18 Using "gender violence" instead of
assault, rape, etc., underscores the patriarchal dynamic involved in episodes
of gender violence on the reservation.
Part II of this comment provides a greater context for gender violence,
beginning with a brief history of gender violence, then delving into specific
circumstances surrounding Indian gender violence. It discusses the
interplay between gender violence, colonization, and genocide. Part III
summarizes the relevant legislation, case law, and legal issues affected by,
and affecting, the SAVE Native Women Act. Part IV overviews SAVE's
form and function and provides some analysis of SAVE, keeping in mind
both criminal and civil jurisdiction issues in Indian Country. Part V
discusses jurisdictional questions that arise due to this proposed legislation.
14. See Mark Rifkin, The Erotics of Sovereignty, in QUEER INDIGENOUS STUDIES:
CRITICAL INTERVENTIONS IN THEORY, POLITICS, AND LITERATURE 172, 174 (Qwo-Li Driskill
et al. eds., 2011).
15. SMITH, CONQUEST, supra note 7, at 3 ("We cannot limit our conception of sexual
violence to individual acts of rape - rather it encompasses a wide range of strategies
designed not only to destroy peoples, but to destroy their sense of being a people.").
16. See PAULA GUNN ALLEN, THE SACRED Hoop: RECOVERING THE FEMININE IN
AMERICAN INDIAN TRADITIONS 203 (2d prtg. 1992).
17. See SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 258
(Ballantine Books 1993) (1972).
18. Id.
387No. 2]
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Part VI provides a brief outline of alternatives to the SAVE legislation. This
comment concludes in Part VII.
II. Background
A. Gender Violence in Law
The law of rape evolved in favor of males.9 It began with the concept
that anatomy reduces women to passive victims in the eyes of the law. 20
And under the primitive doctrine of lex talionis, female rape survivors had
no recourse through which to seek justice under the law. 2 '
"By anatomical fiat - the inescapable construction of their [genitals] -
the human male was a natural predator and the human female served as his
natural prey."22 According to this perspective, females deployed "protective
mating" strategies, including monogamy, to ward off violent sexual
advances by their male counterparts. 2 3 Protective mating, often taking the
form of marriage, reduced the role and status of women to mere property.24
"Rape entered the law through the back door . . . as a property crime of
man against man." 25  The earliest laws governing rape indemnified the
"owner" of the woman according to the woman's status as virginal daughter
or wife.2 6 Because rape was viewed as a property crime, rapists could pay
to excuse their sinister deeds, and faced little threat of prosecution, as rape
remained a private cause of action.27 As a private cause of action, the suit
merely compensates the "owner" of the woman, who lost the value to
exchange the woman's virginity for some form of consideration.28
The law treated rape of a married woman differently. When a man raped
a wife, society found her culpable for the attack, and punished her in kind
19. See BROWNMILLER, supra note 17, at 16-18.
20. See id at 16, 317.
21. Id. at 16. "The law of retaliation, under which punishment should be in kind - an
eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. . . ." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 932 (8th ed. 2004).
22. BROWNMILLER, supra note 17, at 16.
23. See id.
24. See id. at 16-18.
25. Id. at 18.
26. See id. at 18-23 (discussing Babylonian, Mosaic, and Assyrian legal treatments of
rape).
27. See id. at 18.
28. Id. ("Criminal rape, as a patriarchal father saw it, was a violation of the new way of
doing business. It was, in a phrase, the theft of virginity, an embezzlement of his daughter's




with the rapist.2 9 Moreover, marriage nullified any claim a woman might
have against her husband-attacker, as the marriage itself served as
"consent" for all of the husband's advances.30
Around the thirteenth century in England, the Statutes of Westminster
reformulated the logic behind rape's illegality.3 ' For the first time, rape
offended public morality and could be prosecuted by either the offended
parties or the State.32 Additionally, the Statutes of Westminster collapsed
the distinction between the rape of a virginal daughter and the rape of a
wife. The laws emanating from this tradition maintained requirements
that the victim resist the attacker.34 This requirement applied to the lesser
"misdemeanor" crime of "ravishment" as well, which applied when a
woman failed to "object strenuously enough to her own 'defilement."' 3 5
Although this view of rape continued to rest on property law precepts, it
expanded to recognize the agency of victims by framing the offense as "an
issue of public safety and state concern," rather than purely a property
crime.3 6 But since these thirteenth century developments, the law on rape
has been slow to evolve.
In 2012, the United States Department of Justice altered its definition of
rape. 38 Rape is now defined as "[t]he penetration, no matter how slight, of
the vagina or anus with any body part or object, or oral penetration by a sex
organ of another person, without the consent of the victim." 39 This new
definition recognizes the possibility of male rape, and removes the former
29. Id. at 19 ("Regardless of how the incident occurred, the crime was labeled adultery
and both participants were bound and thrown into the river. Appeal from such stem justice
is revealing. A husband was permitted to pull his wife from the water if he so desired; the
king, if he wished, could let his errant male subject go free.").







37. See id. at 30; Deer, Indigenous Jurisprudence, supra note 10, at 124-25 (detailing
the various presumptions utilized against women in the 1970s Anglo-American rape law,
which included "biased suppositions about victims who had previously engaged in sexual
intercourse outside of marriage").
38. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attorney General Eric Holder Announces
Revisions to the Uniform Crime Report's Definition of Rape: Data Reported on Rape Will
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"struggle" requirement. 40 The new definition also reduces the elements of
rape to (1) an act by the perpetrator and (2) the withholding of consent by
the victim. 4 1
Focusing on the consent of the victim certainly reflects progression in
the law, but the definition falls short of encompassing rape's full effect on
an individual or community.4 2 The law must recognize the situational
power at play during incidents of gender violence. 43 A victim's rights need
not be adverse to a defendant; rather, legal requirements for dealing with
victims ought to focus on healing, not hurting." Unfortunately, despite this
new definition, the problem of gender violence persists in Indian Country.45
B. Gender Violence Against Indian Women
Little historical documentation exists detailing the rape of Indian women
46woe reandsln
from the Indian victim's perspective. Indian women remained silent
about the gender violence they experienced to a greater degree than their
black and white counterparts here in America.4 7 What does exist from the
tribal perspective consists primarily of oral history within the tribe.
But there is no shortage of the white man's historical perspective. This
documentation tends to exhibit hubris. Take, for example, a diary passage
written by an associate of Christopher Columbus, Michele de Cuneo:
When I was in the boat, I captured a very beautiful Carib
woman . . . having brought her into my cabin, and she being
naked as is their custom, I conceived desire to take my pleasure.
I wanted to put my desire to execution, but she was unwilling for
me to do so, and treated me with her nails in such [ways] that I
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See Deer, Indigenous Jurisprudence, supra note 10, at 123-24 (discussing the
unique implications rape has on Native women).
43. See BROWNMILLER, supra note 19, at 256 (explaining how a rapist's authority in an
emotional setting or dependent relationship could weaken a victim's physical resistance).
44. See Deer, Indigenous Jurisprudence, supra note 10, at 135-36.
45. It is too early to have any empirical evidence, but a mere redefinition of one type of
gender violence by the Department of Justice does not address the larger systemic problems
that contribute to that violence.
46. BROWNMILLER, supra note 17, at 140.
47. Id. ("Testaments comparable to those that white abolitionists took from black slaves
do not exist for the Indian. Any documentation of the rape of white and Indian women at the
hands of their enemy must be lopsided for this reason.").
48. Id. ("The Indian woman gave her testimony to no one; it was never solicited, except




would have preferred never to have begun. But seeing this .. . I
took a rope-end and thrashed her well, following which she
produced such screaming and wailing as would cause you not to
believe your ears. Finally we reached an agreement such that, I
can tell you, she seemed to have been raised in a veritable school
of harlots....
"The rape of a 'squaw' by white men was not deemed important."50
There are ample, gruesome accounts of the gender violence directed toward
Indian femininity:
You learned, I think, very limited [amounts] in your history
books in this country about what we've suffered. The oral stories
that we know are much more barbaric, like the Sand Creek
massacre, where the stories in our tribe tell how they cut off the
vaginas and the breasts of our women, and they put them on their
saddle horns, and let them dry as decorations. They cut the
babies out of pregnant grandmothers [sic] stomachs, I mean its
[sic] very barbaric. I don't know how you can ever say it was
civilized people who came to create a society here. That is the
violence that we grew up with in war. It is the violence that our
grandmothers survived.5'
But this violence would not only be promulgated and glorified during
war. So often, the violence manifested itself in religious contexts as well,
using Christian ritual to bless genocide:
49. Deer, Sovereignty of the Soul, supra note 5, at 458 (quoting Michele de Cuneo,
Letter to a Friend, in THE DISCOVERY OF AMERICA AND OTHER MYTHS 129 (Thomas
Christensen & Carol Christensen eds., 1992)).
50. BROWNMILLER, supra note 17, at 140.
51. Respondents to Angela Davis's Address, in INCITE! WOMEN OF COLOR AGAINST
VIOLENCE, COLOR OF VIOLENCE: VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN OF COLOR -- CONFERENCE
SUMMARY 7, 13 (Apr. 28-29, 2000) (comments by Gail Small) ("My perspective on violence
against women and against children basically incorporates the whole perspective of
colonization, of our people and our homeland. And I look at it as never, ever, being at peace,
never finding peace and tranquility. Ever since the wars began for our homeland, we've been
at war."). Compare id. (telling the story of sexual violence against Indian women with first-
hand accounts) with BROWNMILLER, supra note 17, at 150-53, (noting that many stories of
sexual violence against Indian people were lost because no one in white society would
record or publish those stories) and Andrea Smith, Not an Indian Tradition: The Sexual
Colonization of Native People, HYPATIA, Spring 2003, at 70, 75 [hereinafter Smith, Indian
Tradition] (silencing Indian claims of sexual violence).
391No. 2]
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One woman, big with child, rushed into the church, clasping the
alter and crying for mercy for herself and unborn babe. She was
followed, and fell pierced with a dozen lances ... the child was
torn alive from the yet palpitating body of its mother, first
plunged into the holy water to be baptized, and immediately its
brains were dashed out against a wall.52
The violence did not abate over time. Today, Indian women face
hardships that, while perhaps not as publically graphic, are just as violent as
the incidents described above. In a study of 105 Native American female
prostitutes, the Minnesota Indian Women's Sexual Assault Coalition found
that 92% of interviewees had been raped.5 ' Eighty-four percent
experienced physical assault in prostitution, and "72% suffered traumatic
brain injuries in prostitution."5 4 As the study explained, "[r]esearch . . .
clearly indicates that indigenous women are overrepresented in prostitution,
reflecting a race hierarchy within the sexist and classist institution of
prostitution itself."55  Despite this statistic, "most research on violence
against Native women in the United States fails to include prostitution and
sex trafficking as forms of sexual violence."56  The breadth of gender
violence directed toward Indian women knows few bounds, but consistently
knows the same perpetrator: non-Indians.
Unlike most incidents of rape, rape committed against Indian women is
overwhelmingly inter-racial, not intra-racial. U.S. Department of Justice
statistics indicate "that most Native rape victims report their assailant to be
non-Native."" In fact, "over 70% of the assailants are white," and
according to the Department of Justice, "nine in ten American Indian
victims of rape or sexual assault had white or black assailants."59 The need
for criminal prosecution of non-Indian rapists cannot be hyperbolized. The
impact of this demographic divide is brought into sharp focus when
discussing jurisdictional impotency, as detailed infra.
52. Smith, Indian Tradition, supra note 51, at 75 (citation omitted).
53. MELISSA FARLEY ET AL., GARDEN OF TRUTH: THE PROSTITUTION AND TRAFFICKING
OF NATIVE WOMEN IN MINNESOTA 3 (2011).
54. Id
55. Id. at 17.
56. Id. at 14.
57. Deer, Sovereignty of the Soul, supra note 5, at 457.
58. Deer, Indigenous Jurisprudence, supra note 10, at 128.




C. Gender Violence as Colonialism
Why is this violence so prevalent and gruesome? There is no beginning
or end to the relationship between colonial violence and gender violence.so
Today, however, the latter reinforces the former: "Colonialism needs
heteropatriarchy to naturalize hierarchies and unequal gender relations."
The colonizer considers Native bodies as something other than their own;
something specifically inferior.6 2
This mindset is normalized through history and culture.63  Early
colonizers made use of biblical comparisons to Canaanites to cast images of
Indians as sexually abhorrent; as polluted. 4 "Because Indian bodies are
'dirty,' they are considered sexually violable and 'rapable,' and the rape of
bodies that are considered inherently impure or dirty simply does not
count."65 When a white man did express genuine interest in an Indian
woman, his affections often coincided with a race and gender hierarchy in
conflict with indigenous conceptions of sexual autonomy.66  "According
to. . . colonial logic[], Native women need to be managed, because they
lack control over their sexuality and therefore their bodies."67
This hierarchy imposes stereotypes on both Native women's desires and
land's "natural" use to justify the exploitation and violence inflicted.
"These images of Native women equate the Native female body with the
conquest of land in the 'New World."' 6 9 The images conflate "Native
women's bodies with racialized and sexualized narratives of the land,"
constructing it "as penetrable and open to ownership through
heteropatriarchal domination."7 0
60. Smith, Indian Tradition, supra note 51, at 71.
61. Chris Finley, Decolonizing the Queer Native Body (and Recovering the Native Bull-
Dyke): Bring "Sexy Back" and out ofNative Studies' Closet, in QUEER INDIGENOUS STUDIES:
CRITICAL INTERVENTIONS IN THEORY, POLITICS, AND LITERATURE, supra note 14, at 31, 34.
62. See id.
63. See SMITH, CONQUEST, supra note 7, at 17-20.
64. Id. at 10.
65. Id.
66. Deer, Indigenous Jurisprudence, supra note 10, at 130-31.
67. Finley, supra note 61, at 35.
68. See id. at 34.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 35.
393No. 2]
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But this merely hints at the underlying purpose of gender violence
directed at Indian communities.' What is more, gender violence is a means
by which colonialism can flourish:
[G]ender violence is a primary tool of colonialism and white
supremacy. Colonizers did not just kill off Indigenous peoples
in this land, but Native massacres were always accompanied by
sexual mutilation and rape. . . . [T]he goal of colonialism is not
just to kill colonized peoples, but to destroy their sense of being
people. It is through sexual violence that a colonizing group
attempts to render a colonized people inherently rapable, their
lands inherently invadable, and their resources inherently
extractable.7 2
Gender violence cannot be isolated to specific incidents.73 Gender violence
is systemic.74 Explicit or not, America's policy was to exterminate the
Indian population.7 ' Gender violence is but one method of achieving that
policy.
76
Gender violence in U.S. courts manifests itself according to the same
colonial mindset.77 Attacks against Native American women have been
treated with a lesser degree of seriousness than attacks against other women
because "their abuse was seen as being outside the law." 78 In fact, such
discrimination has been codified in some states. In 1968, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld a statute that imposed a harsher penalty on a rapist
for the rape of a white woman compared to an Indian woman.79 Such
discrimination is typical of a society imbued with the genocidal logic of
71. See generally SMITH, CONQUEST, supra note 7, at 7-33 (discussing sexual violence
as a tool of genocide).
72. Andrea Smith, Queer Theory and Native Studies: The Heteronormativity of Settler
Colonialism, in QUEER INDIGENOUS STUDIES: CRITICAL INTERVENTIONS IN THEORY, POLITICS,
AND LITERATURE, supra note 14, at 59 [hereinafter Smith, Queer Theory].




77. See Deer, Indigenous Jurisprudence, supra note 10, at 125 ("The colonialist mindset






colonialism.80 And still, the law continues to bless the theft of Indian land
and the denigration of Native bodies.81
III. Summary of the Law
This section discusses the various statutes and cases affected by and
affecting SAVE. SAVE is an amendment to several laws, so this section
will begin with a summary of each law. The laws include the Indian Civil
Rights Act ("ICRA"), 82 the Tribal Law and Order Act ("TLOA"),8 3 and the
Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA"). An overview of key cases and
legal doctrines follows and provides a background for discussion of the
legal issues implicated by SAVE.
A. The Indian Civil Rights Act
Passed in 1968, in the wake of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, ICRA has the same flavor as the Civil Rights
Act and Voting Rights Act." Like the other acts, ICRA limits the power of
government to enact certain laws and policies pertaining to its citizens."
Whereas the Civil Rights Act aimed to remedy state government
discrimination against African Americans, ICRA generally restricted what
powers tribal courts may use against any criminal defendant, Indian or non-
Indian.87 Specifically, the law limited a tribal government's authority to
pass certain laws, exercise police powers, and prosecute Indian people in
88certain ways.
80. See M. A. Jaimes Guerrero, "Patriarchal Colonialism" and Indigenism:
Implications for Native Feminist Spirituality and Native Womanism, HYPATIA, Spring 2003,
at 58, 60-61.
81. See generally Deer, Indigenous Jurisprudence, supra note 10, at 125-27 (discussing
the federal government's continued colonial practice of failure to respond to rape of Native
women).
82. Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (2006).
83. Tribal Law and Order Act of2010, Pub L. No. 111-211, §§ 211-214, 124 Stat. 2258
(2010).
84. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 42 U.S.C. § 13981
(1994).
85. Compare Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (2006), with Civil Rights
Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964), and Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §
1973 (2006).
86. Compare 25 U.S.C §§ 1301-1303 with 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 42 U.S.C. § 1973.
87. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303.
88. See id. § 1302.
395No. 2]
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The language of ICRA constrained tribal legislative powers by mirroring
the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution.8 9 Additionally, it placed severe restrictions on a tribal court's
power to sentence convicted criminals, stating that no Indian tribe, in
exercising powers of self-government, shall "impose for conviction of any
[one] offense any penalty or punishment greater than imprisonment for a
term of [one] year or a fine of $5,000, or both." 90 What is more, it does not
extend the exercise of tribal powers over non-Indians.9'
Today, ICRA recognizes the inherent power of Indian nations over all
Indian people. But the original version of SAVE withheld this language,
succumbing to the Supreme Court's misguided interpretation in Duro v.
Reina.92 This decision limited a tribe's exercise of inherent sovereignty
solely to members of that specific tribe.93 Subsequently, the "Duro Fix," an
Amendment to ICRA, nixed the application of this precedent. 94 ICRA now
acknowledges that tribes hold inherent power "to exercise criminal
jurisdiction over all Indians," regardless of tribal affiliation.95
B. The Tribal Law and Order Act
The TLOA strived to increase and enhance federal and tribal law
enforcement and prosecution methods in Indian Country.96 The legislation
increased federal accountability for criminal activity in Indian Country. 97
Moreover, the TLOA recognized that "the United States has distinct legal,
treaty, and trust obligations to provide for the public safety of Indian
country." In an effort to meet these obligations, the TLOA allocated
additional resources for federal law enforcement use and prosecution in
Indian Country.99  Among other things, this legislation increased the
89. See id.
90. Id. § 1302(a)(7)(B).
91. See id. §§ 1301, 1302.
92. See generally Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), superseded by statute as
recognized in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
93. See Duro, 495 U.S. at 679.
94. See generally Lara, 541 U.S. 193.
95. See 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2).
96. Gideon M. Hart, A Crisis in Indian Country: An Analysis of the Tribal Law and
Order Act of 2010,23 REGENT U. L. REV. 139, 164-65 (2010).
97. See Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub L. No. 111-211, §§ 211-214, 124 Stat.
2258 (2010).
98. Id § 202(a)(1).




permitted sentencing authority of tribal courts.'o But section 206 makes
clear that "[n]othing in this Act confers on an Indian tribe criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians."'o
Nevertheless, the TLOA attempted to bolster tribal law enforcement by
implementing and coordinating requirements with state and federal
officials, and providing tribal law enforcement access to the National
Criminal Information Center database.' 02  Importantly, this coordination
effort required the Department of Justice to share prosecution information
with tribal justice officials. 10 3 This regulation was designed to keep tribal
justice officials informed of the criminal prosecutions affecting their
tribes - even if prosecution is impossible under TLOA.1  Last, TLOA
made funds available for tribal law enforcement agencies.'s These funds
were desperately needed.
As of June 2000, American Indian tribes operated 171 law
enforcement agencies and the BIA operated another thirty-seven.
Although these agencies are responsible for the lion's share of
direct law enforcement in Indian Country, most do not have the
manpower, training, or financial resources needed to police
adequately the often-enormous areas for which they are
responsible. 0 6
Although these numbers may have changed since 2000, law enforcement
in Indian Country remains woefully underfunded.'07 TLOA funding
allocations vitally impact programs, but do not replace the pressing need to
develop additional, more effective crime-fighting initiatives.
SAVE builds on the TLOA by expanding tribal criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians in cases of domestic or dating violence.108 Further, SAVE
100. See id. § 234(a)(3) (increasing the length of sentence and amount of fine imposed).
101. Id. § 206.
102. Id. § 233.
103. See generally id. § 251 (requiring the FBI Director to work with tribal law
enforcement for purposes of establishing and using tribal data collection systems).
104. Hart, supra note 96, at 166-67.
105. Id. § 243.
106. Hart, supra note 96, at 160 (footnotes omitted).
107. See U.S. COMM'N ON CiVIL RIGHTS, A QUIET CRISIS: FEDERAL FUNDING AND UNMET
NEEDS IN INDIAN COuNTRY 75-79 (2003), available at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/na0703/
na0204.pdf [hereinafter QUIET CRISIS].
108. S. 1763, 112th Cong. sec. 201, § 204(b)(1) (2011).
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offers grants to tribal governments, making more funds available to support
and build tribal law enforcement agencies.109
C. The Violence Against Women Act
Despite the Supreme Court's ruling in United States v. Morrison,"0
VAWA remains (mostly) good law."' VAWA laid the groundwork for
federal gender-violence investigation, prosecution, and sentencing."12
VAWA includes a grant of tribal jurisdiction that reads:
[A] tribal court shall have full civil jurisdiction to enforce
protection orders, including authority to enforce any orders
through civil contempt proceedings, exclusion of violators from
Indian lands, and other appropriate mechanisms, in matters
arising within the authority of the tribe." 3
This language has been read to bestow no special jurisdictional powers to
tribes.1 4 Nevertheless, this legislation critically outlined the extent of civil
jurisdiction possessed by tribes over protective order litigation.
VAWA ensures that the courts give tribal protective orders full faith and
credit.' 15 But tribal protective orders only receive full faith and credit if the
protective order is issued against persons over whom the tribe has
jurisdiction."'6  The tribal court must also comply with due process
requirements, giving the person against whom the order is issued notice and
an opportunity to be heard." 7
Once properly issued, the statute gives broad discretion for Indian
nations to enforce protective orders."'8 Notice need not be provided to the
person against whom the protective order has been issued for domestication
of a foreign protective order in tribal court."' In practice, this means that
tribes are fully empowered to enforce state-issued protective orders, and
vice versa.
109. Id. sec. 201, § 204(g).
110. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
111. See id. at 603 (striking the portion of VAWA that provided a civil rights remedy).
112. See 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (2006).
113. Id. § 2265(E).
114. See Martinez v. Martinez, No. C08-5503, 2008 WL 5262793, at *3-4 (W.D. Wash.
Dec. 16, 2008).
115. 18 U.S.C. § 2265(a).
116. Id. § 2265(b).
117. Id.
118. Id. § 2265(d).





Criminal jurisdiction exercised by Indian nations and the United States
on one another's citizens has long been called into question. The values
undergirding each system are not always compatible. This tension has led
to culling the authority each system may have to mete out justice to citizens
of the other system.
The United States Supreme Court first recognized the prosecutorial
limitations of Indians by non-Indians in Ex parte Crow Dog.120 The facts of
this case are simple: Crow Dog, a member of the Brule Sioux, murdered
Spotted Tail, a member of the same tribe.12' The Court decided whether a
U.S. territorial court had jurisdiction to prosecute the murder.122
In Crow Dog, the Court recognized the Sioux Nation's right of self-
determination: "The pledge to secure to these people . . . an orderly
government . .. necessarily implies . . . it was the very purpose of all these
arrangements to introduce and naturalize among them, was the highest and
best of all, that of self-government, the regulation by themselves of their
own domestic affairs. . Reading past the paternalistic language, the
opinion premises its holding on the idea that the Sioux Nation is distinct,
requiring specific statutory language to abrogate the treaty that ensured that
it would retain exclusive criminal jurisdiction over Indian-on-Indian
crimes.124
Nearly a century later, the Court, in Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe,12 5
divested all Indian nations of the power to prosecute non-Indians.12 6 In this
case, the Suquamish Tribe arrested and began prosecuting two non-Indians
for the assault of a Bureau of Indian Affairs officer.12 7  The opinion
surveyed relevant Suquamish treaties and tribal criminal statutes.12 8
Likewise, the Court spent a large effort surveying jurisdictional assertions
made by other Indian nations vis-Ai-vis their respective treaties or criminal
statutes.12 9 The Court set this surveying aside, however, and held that
120. See generally 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
121. Id. at 557.
122. Id. at 570.
123. Id. at 568.
124. Id. at 570-71.
125. 435 U.S. 191 (1978), superseded by statute as recognized in United States v. Lara,
541 U.S. 193 (2004).
126. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 212.
127. Id. at 194.
128. Id. at 195.
129. See id. at 195-99.
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Indian tribes gave up the right to prosecute non-Indians (unless Congress
allows otherwise) based on their "[submission] to the overriding
sovereignty of the United States." 
130
The Court's decision is based on three rationales.13' The first is a general
practice of the Court obscuring and over-simplifying the law and facts in
order to reach a favorable outcome.13 2 Basically, the Court agrees with the
political branches of the U.S. government that Indian tribes could not
exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians because they are
"diminished sovereigns."' 3 Second, the Court interpreted the treaty
language acknowledging the Tribe's dependence on the United States as a
relinquishment of criminal jurisdiction by the Tribe.' 34 This rationale is
heavily buttressed by the third reason. Without express treaty language to
the contrary, treaty provisions are "read against a backdrop of the common
federal understanding that Indian tribes had no criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians."' 35  This directly contravenes the well-established Indian
treaty canons of construction, which demand that treaties shall be construed
in favor of tribes.136
The third reason that the Court proffered in reaching its decision rested
on a general distaste for tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians.13 7 "[W]aiting
in the wings was the notion of 'intrinsic limitations' on tribal governmental
powers." The Court refused to recognize a tribal government
"inconsistent with" this perceived dependent status, regardless of the treaty
language present or historical understanding. 3 9  Rather, the heart of the
decision rested on the principle that the Suquamish Indian Tribe could not
exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians because to do so would be
inconsistent with its dependence on the United States.140
130. Id. at210.
13 1. See Judith V. Royster, Oliphant and Its Discontents: An Essay Introducing the Case
for Reargument Before the American Indian Nations Supreme Court, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB.













Much like a balloon, sovereignty may be deflated, but it can be re-
inflated.141 This rule, developed in United States v. Lara, is necessary to
understand the function of portions of the SAVE Native Women Act.14 2
The Lara Court addressed Congress's ability to restore inherent tribal
powers, such as those powers used to prosecute non-member Indians in a
tribal court.14 3 Lara, through retroactive fiat, declared Congress capable of
rekindling tribal sovereign authority through its plenary power over Indian
affairs.'" Today, ICRA is interpreted to recognize the inherent tribal
sovereignty over all Native American criminal defendants.145 The SAVE
Native Women Act attempts to follow this rubric, giving a tribe the
authority to prosecute domestic violence offenses committed by non-
Indians. 146 While questions of tribal criminal jurisdiction have become
clearer, the constitutionality of tribal civil jurisdiction has not been directly
tested.
E. Civil Jurisdiction
In Montana v. United States,'4 7 the Court curtailed the Crow Tribe's civil
jurisdictional authority.148 The Court's reasoning echoed that espoused in
Oliphant three years earlier: "[E]xercise of tribal power beyond what is
necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations is
inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive
without express congressional delegation." 4 9 The Court then expanded this
language to declare a permanent presumption "that the inherent sovereign
powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of
the tribe."5 o This became known as the Montana rule, to which two
narrow exceptions were applied. The first permits regulation of
nonmember activity that is the product of "consensual [commercial]
relationships with the tribe or its members . . . .",5t The second exception
allows regulation where the nonmember activity "threatens or has some
141. See generally United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
142. See generally id.
143. See id at 199-208.
144. See id at 210.
145. Will Trachman, Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction After U.S. v. Lara: Answering
Constitutional Challenges to the Duro Fix, 93 CALIF. L. REv. 847, 849-50 (2005).
146. See S. 1763, 112th Cong. sec. 201, § 204(b) (2011).
147. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
148. See id. at 564-66.
149. Id. at 545-46.
150. Id. at 565.
151. Id.
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direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health
or welfare of the tribe." 52
Courts have been stingy when applying these exceptions. One federal
district court read the exceptions so narrowly as to exclude a tribe's civil
adjudicatory authority over a domestic dispute between nonmember
residents within the tribe's reservation. 53 The SAVE Native Women Act
responds to these narrow judicial interpretations with an unmistakable grant
of civil authority over protective orders.154
IV The Stand Against Violence and Empower Native Women Act: Sections,
Features, and Analysis of the Bill
A. Goals of the Bill
SAVE addresses the epidemic of gender violence in Indian Country by
establishing three express goals: (1) "decrease the incidence of violent
crime against Indian women," (2) "strengthen the capacity of Indian tribes
to exercise [their] sovereign authority," and (3) "ensure that perpetrators ...
are held accountable."' 55
Over a dozen senators sponsored the bill'5 6 and have incorporated
numerous Department of Justice suggestions with regard to the problem of
gender violence in Indian Country.'" These goals are noble, and SAVE is
a step toward their attainment. But there are several practical limitations of
SAVE that make the ultimate accomplishment of these goals less likely.
B. Funding and Grants
One of the biggest practical limitations in the way of accomplishing the
Act's goals is finance. Funding the proposed programs poses a challenge
that SAVE strives to remedy. Most tribes are not wealthy and rely heavily
on outside support for law enforcement programs.' 5 8 SAVE addresses this
need head-on by opening up additional avenues for the federal government
152. Id. at 566.
153. Martinez v. Martinez, No. C08-5503, 2008 WL 5262793, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Dec.
16, 2008).
154. See S. 1763, 112th Cong. § 202(e) (2011).
155. Id. pmbl.
156. Bill Summary & Status: 112th Congress (2011-2012) S.1763, U.S. S. CoMm. ON
INDIAN AFFAIRS, http://www.indian.senate.gov/issues/2011-11-07.cfm (last visited May 18,
2012) (listing one sponsor and fourteen cosponsors).
157. Perrelli Statement, supra note 1.




to provide grants to the tribal governments.'5 9 These funds make SAVE's
implementation more plausible. 6 0 SAVE makes available additional grants
for tribal governments and expands the purposes to which those funds may
be applied.16 1  Moreover, SAVE makes clear that new funds would
supplement, not supplant, other governmental funds provided to tribes.16 2
This means that SAVE does not substitute the underfunded programs under
one law for the underfunded programs under SAVE.
Section 204(g) designates the purposes for which grants may be made to
tribal governments. Grants to tribal governments may be used to: (1)
strengthen the criminal justice system, including law enforcement,
prosecution, trial, appeals, probation, detention and its alternatives, and
writing criminal statutes, and to provide "culturally appropriate services and
assistance for victims and their families;" (2) provide minimum services to
comply with U.S. due process standards, including no-cost, effective
counsel for defendants; (3) pay for jury trials; and (4) provide for victims'
rights that comply with U.S. law and are "consistent with tribal law and
custom." 1 63
SAVE's grants to tribal governments acts to strengthen tribal sovereignty
and enables the provision of services not otherwise possible. Moreover, the
allowance of funding for programs specific to each tribe's culture works
toward building an indigenous jurisprudence of gender violence. Currently,
hardly any tribal law on "sexual violence incorporates a unique and
independent indigenous perspective."'6 An independent indigenous effort
to create laws is one way in which this bill can succeed. Part of re-
conceptualizing jurisdiction entails changing the ways the government
legislates tribal authority. Writing laws congruous with Native experiences
provides the perfect forum in which to experiment with nuanced ideas
about jurisdiction. This is a necessary first step to end the harms of gender
violence in a way that addresses needs specific to Native American women.
C. Data on Domestic Violence
Section 104 alters the scheme designed to monitor and collect data about
violence against women as per the Violence Against Women and
159. S. 1763, 112th Cong. secs. 102, 201, § 204(g) (2011).
160. See generally QUIET CRists, supra note 107.
161. S. 1763, 112th Cong. secs. 102, 201, § 204(g).
162. Id. sec. 201, § 204(h).
163. Id. sec. 201, § 204(g).
164. Deer, Indigenous Jurisprudence, supra note 10, at 128.
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Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005."' The alterations
broaden the scope of the inquiry made by tribal coalitions, including a new
focus on sex trafficking in Indian Country. 66
Expanding the scope of inquiry is necessary. As aforementioned, most
studies that document violence against Indian women fail to include data
involving sex trafficking or prostitution.' Sex trafficking occurs at
epidemic levels in Indian Country.16 8  Yet, likely due to definitional
confusions, a lack of arrests and prosecutions renders data about sex
trafficking on Indian lands recondite.16 9
A grant established for the collection and analysis of data regarding
violence against Native American women under the SAVE Native Women
Act is delegated to tribal coalitions.170 A tribal coalition differs from tribal
governments in the same way that NGOs differ from the United States
government.17' Tribal coalitions are. entities wholly separate and distinct
from tribal governments.17 2 The Attorney General awards grants to these
coalitions based on his or her satisfaction that the statutory criteria for tribal
coalition grants have been met,173 of which there are three: (1) the tribal
coalition accedes to all elements of a tribal coalition defined in the Violence
Against Women Act, (2) the Office on Violence Against Women
recognizes the tribal coalition, and (3) the coalition "provides services to
Indian tribes." 74 Additionally, other organizations that propose to start a
tribal coalition where none exists may be eligible for such funds.175
D. Special Domestic Violence Jurisdiction
Section 204 outlines the method by which a tribe may begin exercising
special domestic violence jurisdiction.176 It states: "At any time during the
165. S. 1763, 112th Cong. sec. 104, § 904(a).
166. Id. sec. 104, § 904(a)(2)(C).
167. FARLEY ET AL., supra note 53, at 14.
168. See generally id.
169. Id. at 14. The part about jurisdictional confusion is a proposition that I am making. i
feel like the paper supports this conclusion. If not, there is adequate support for the
remainder of the sentence on that page, at least with regards to recondite data.]
170. S. 1763, 112th Cong. sec. 102, § 2001(d)(1).
171. See 42 U.S.C. § 13925(a)(29) (2006) (stating a tribal coalition means a "nonprofit,
nongovernmental [organization] . . . addressing domestic violence and sexual assault against
American Indian or Alaska Native women").
172. Id.
173. See S. 1763, 112th Cong. sec. 102, § 2001(d)(2)(A).
174. Id. sec. 102, § 2001(d)(2)(A)(i)-(iii).
175. Id sec. 102, § 2001(d)(2)(III)(A)(ii).




2-year period beginning on the date of enactment of this Act, an Indian tribe
may ask the Attorney General to designate the tribe as a participating tribe
under section 204(a) of Public Law 90-284 on an accelerated basis.,' 7 7
Another portion of SAVE provides the guidelines for the Attorney General
to use in making decisions to approve or disapprove a tribe's request:1
The Attorney General (or a designee of the Attorney General)
may grant a request under subparagraph (A) after coordinating
with the Secretary of the Interior (or a designee of the Secretary),
consulting with affected Indian tribes, and concluding that the
criminal justice system of the requesting tribe has adequate
safeguards in place to protect defendants' rights, consistent with
section 204 of Public Law 90-284.179
Moreover, SAVE provides special rights for defendants coming before
tribal courts:
In a criminal proceeding in which a participating tribe exercises
special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction, the participating
tribe shall provide to the defendant (1) all applicable rights under
this Act; (2) if a term of imprisonment of any length is imposed,
all rights described in section 202(c); and (3) all other rights
whose protection is necessary under the Constitution of the
United States in order for Congress to recognize and affirm the
inherent power of the participating tribe to exercise criminal
jurisdiction over the defendant.o
These rights will likely need to be protected to the satisfaction of the
Attorney General before granting approval of grants to a tribe."'
E. Expanding Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction
While not wholly overturning Oliphant, SAVE carves out a discrete
exception from the blanket prohibition on the exercise of tribal criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indian people.'82 Oliphant stands for the principle
that, absent express congressional approval, Indian nations do not have the
177. Id. sec. 201, § 204(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
178. Id. sec. 201, § 204(b)(2)(B).
179. Id.
180. Id. sec. 201, § 204(e).
181. Id. sec. 201, § 204(g)(2)-(3).
182. See id. sec. 201, § 204(b); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210
(1978).
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power to try and sentence non-Indians.18 3  SAVE abides by this rule,
providing congressional approval and recognition of Indian government
power to exercise limited criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.
SAVE permits a participating tribe "to exercise special domestic
violence criminal jurisdiction over all persons."l8 4  Special domestic
violence criminal jurisdiction entails the authority to prosecute criminal
conduct that is either (1) an "[a]ct of domestic violence or dating violence
that occurs in the Indian country of the participating tribe," or (2) an act
occurring in Indian Country of a participating tribe that violates a protection
order.'8 1
Jurisdictional expansion generally strengthens tribal governments. This
expansion, while narrow in subject matter, is an excellent step forward
because it addresses two contributing facets of gender violence: an inability
to protect victims and punish perpetrators. With jurisdictional authority a
tribe is better positioned to prevent repeat offenses and remove the
perpetrator from the community.
"[T]he expanded tribal court criminal jurisdiction under the proposed
statute would still be subject to federal review of tribal criminal
convictions, adding another safeguard for non-Indians."' 8 6 This attention to
the rights of non-Indians is the product of a myopic focus on measuring
indigenous judicial systems against the framework of the American judicial
system. If tribal judgments are repeatedly overturned upon habeas review,
then self-determination becomes nothing more than a pretext for increased
federal involvement in Indian affairs. This is especially true given the
nature of habeas review of a tribal court judgment: "[O]btaining habeas
review of tribal decisions is significantly easier than for state or federal
adjudications."' 8 7 Persistent review by federal courts may eviscerate any
chance of developing tribal jurisprudence because reviewing federal courts
are bound by federal standards, not by tribal interpretations of the law.
In no way can this expansion cover the gamut of gender violence
experienced by Native American women. For instance, the definitions for
183. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210 (stating that "[b]y submitting to the overriding
sovereignty of the United States, Indian tribes . . . give up their power to try non-Indian
citizens . .. except in a manner acceptable to Congress").
184. S. 1763, 112th Cong. sec. 201, § 204(b)(1).
185. Id. sec. 201, § 204(c)(1)-(2).
186. Samuel E. Ennis, Reaffirming Indian Tribal Court Criminal Jurisdiction Over Non-






"domestic violence" and "dating violence" include only persons that have
had some sort of social relationship with the victim, usually of an intimate
nature.'8 8 This means that tribes remain unable to prosecute or adjudicate
gender violence crimes perpetrated by strangers to the victim. Moreover,
the jurisdictional grant places a geographic limitation on the exercise of
jurisdiction, in that a tribe only has jurisdiction over conduct that "occurs in
the Indian [C]ountry of the participating tribe."l 89  This raises new
questions, such as whether a tribe can pass long-arm statutes if the criminal
conduct occurred in the participating tribe's Indian Country but the
perpetrator now resides outside of Indian Country. What if the person is a
stranger to the victim and the tribe, but decides to remain in the
participating tribe's Indian Country? Would the tribe have jurisdiction in
that case? These are issues that SAVE, as written, leaves unanswered.
Future courts will be forced to wrestle with these questions in the absence
of congressional clarity - an inauspicious fate for tribal governments
seeking stability.
F. Protective Orders
Tribal protective orders already exist.190 SAVE aims to confirm
Congress's intent that these tribal protective orders may be issued and
enforced against anyone.1 91 This is an affirmation of civil jurisdiction, but
it also contains quasi-criminal enforcement tools. Specifically, tribal
protective orders may be enforced by "exclud[ing] violators from Indian
land."l 92 This exclusion or banishment is a traditional form of indigenous
punishment. 19 3  Although not meant to be an extension of criminal
jurisdiction, this section contemplates dealing with gender violence using
traditional indigenous methods. Regardless of method, clarifying
Congress's intent to grant tribes full authority to issue and enforce
protective orders over non-Indians is necessary, given recent district court
rulings.19 4
188. S. 1763, 112th Cong. sec. 201, § 204(a)(l)-(2).
189. Id. sec. 201, § 204(c).
190. 18 U.S.C. § 2265(e) (2006).
191. Perrelli Statement, supra note 1.
192. S. 1763, 112th Cong. sec. 202, § 2265(e).
193. See Deer, Indigenous Jurisprudence, supra note 10, at 139-43.
194. See, e.g., Martinez v. Martinez, No. C08-5503, 2008 WL 5262793, at *34 (W.D.
Wash. Dec. 16, 2008).
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Section 202 of SAVE is intended to reverse the federal district court
decision, Martinez v. Martinez,195 in which the court held that an Indian
nation lacks authority to issue a protective order against anyone except its
own tribal members.'96 SAVE's broad language affords tribes jurisdiction
to enter protection orders against anyone - Native American or
otherwise.197 Moreover, the remedies for violation of a tribal protective
order are fully enforceable through civil contempt proceedings.198
Under SAVE, the following violations trigger tribal jurisdiction to
enforce protective orders:
[the violation] occurs in the Indian country of the participating
tribe; and [] violates the portion of a protection order that--{i)
prohibits or provides protection against violent or threatening
acts or harassment against, sexual violence against, contact or
communication with, or physical proximity to, another person;
and (ii)(I) was issued against the defendant; (II) is enforceable
by the participating tribe; and (III) is consistent with section
2265(b) of title 18, United States Code.'
The emphasized portion of the above quotation is an excerpt from the
VAWA.
Section 202 unmistakably expresses a congressional intent that tribal
courts exercise "full civil jurisdiction to issue and enforce protection
orders" over any person for "matters arising anywhere in the Indian country
of the Indian tribe."2m This language makes the involved person's status
irrelevant to the tribal jurisdiction question. Instead, a reviewing court will
focus on whether the dispute arose in the Indian Country of the Indian tribe
that is asserting jurisdiction.
Almost certainly, the tribal protective order portion of the bill would be
interpreted as a reaffirmation of tribal sovereignty. The section permits the
195. Id; Perrelli Statement, supra note 1 "[Alt least one Federal court has opined that
tribes lack civil jurisdiction to issue and enforce protection orders against non-Indians who
reside on tribal lands. That ruling undermines the ability of tribal courts to protect
victims. Accordingly, new Federal legislation could confirm the intent of Congress in
enacting the Violence Against Women Act of 2000 by clarifying that tribal courts have full
civil jurisdiction to issue and enforce certain protection orders involving any persons, Indian
or non-Indian."); S. 1763, 112th Cong. sec. 201, § 204.
196. Martinez, 2008 WL 5262793, at *3-4.
197. See S. 1763, I12th Cong. sec. 202, § 2265(e).
198. Id.
199. Id. sec. 201, § 204(c)(2) (emphasis added).




full and unfettered use of civil remedies to enforce tribal protective orders.
The absence of status limitations means that tribes would have jurisdiction
to enforce these protective orders against all people whose conduct violates
a protective order while within the Indian Country of the participating tribe.
One may reasonably argue that the SAVE Native Women Act overturns
the Washington state district court decision in Martinez v. Martinez. 201 The
federal court refused to recognize that the Suquamish Tribe could exercise
jurisdiction over a dispute between two individuals who did not hold
membership in that tribe and lived on non-Indian fee land within the
202reservation. The Martinez court applied the two exceptions of the
Montana test to reach its conclusion. 203 After deciding that the parties'
nonmember status rendered the first exception inapplicable, because neither
had a consensual commercial relationship with the tribe, the court briefly
moved its efforts to the second exception, which deals with activities that
may "imperil the subsistence of the tribal communities." 2  Rather than
determine if divorce, child custody, and protective orders have any bearing
on the subsistence of the tribal community, however, the court disregarded
the argument as inapplicable because of the parties' nonmember status.20 5
As nonmembers, the court reasoned, the parties' domestic relations do not
directly affect the Tribe's health or welfare.206
The court's reasoning is flawed. Domestic relations form the foundation
of any community. Unregulated domestic disputes blight a community - a
blight that is replicated and remains unrepaired. Importantly, the SAVE
Native Women Act acknowledges the centrality of family life to
community well being.207 For this reason, SAVE expands tribal jurisdiction
regarding protective orders to any person.
The legislation needs to make clear Congress's desire to permit tribes to
wield this jurisdiction over anyone within their reservations. Section
1151(a)'s language does yield to this point with the inclusion of
"notwithstanding the issuance of any patent." 2 08 Recently, however, the
Supreme Court narrowly construed this specific language in matters
201. See Martinez, 2008 WL 5262793, at *6-7 (finding the Suquamish Tribe without
jurisdiction to enter protective orders or divorces for two non-members Native Americans
residing within the Suquamish reservation).
202. Id. at *2.
203. Id. at *5-7.
204. Id. at *6.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See generally S. 1763, 112th Cong. sec. 201, § 204(b)(2) (2011).
208. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a).
409No. 2]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2012
AMERICAN INDIAN LA WREVIEW
relating to the exercise of regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indians.2 09
Simply referring to the Indian Country statute does not delineate clear
jurisdictional boundaries that can be applied by law enforcement. With
courts actively dispossessing Indian nations of sovereign authority, it would
behoove Congress to be more precise with language concerning permitted
tribal jurisdiction.
G. Definition of Indian Country
Section 1151 defines Indian Country to include reservations, dependent
Indian communities, and allotment lands.2t o In Martinez, the parties lived
together on non-Indian fee lands that lay within the Suquamish
reservation. 2 1 1 Recall that the touchstone for the Montana rule is the status
of the land.2 12 Based on this touchstone, because non-Indians held the
Martinez land in fee, the court presumed that tribal jurisdiction was
invalid.213 SAVE's fix to the Martinez case does address the issue. If
SAVE is enacted, a court will be able to point to the grant of special
domestic violence criminal jurisdiction as express statutory authority for
tribal jurisdiction over a protective order dispute, making the issues in a
case like Martinez fall under the "matters arising . . . within the authority of
the Indian tribe."2 14
H. Increased Sentencing
The SAVE Native Women Act does not increase tribal courts' available
sentencing range when exercising their special domestic violence
jurisdiction.2 15 SAVE would, however, increase the permitted sentencing
by federal courts of repeat offenders that received prior convictions in tribal
216courts. This change would double the available sentencing range for
persons previously convicted by tribal courts for domestic violence or
stalking offenses.2 17
In the opinion of this author, the biggest boost to tribal self-governance
would result from nixing tribal sentencing limitations. These limitations,
stemming from ICRA, often make prosecutions for particularly heinous
209. See generally Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
210. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006).
211. Martinez, 2008 WL 5262793, at *1.
212. Id. at *5.
213. Id. at *4.
214. S. 1763, 112th Cong. sec. 202, 18 U.S.C. § 2265(e).
215. See generally S. 1763, 112th Cong. (2011).
216. Id. sec. 205, § 2265A(b)(1)(B).




crimes ineffectual. 2 18  What impact does a one-year jail sentence and
minimal fine have on behavior such as rape? SAVE's current form will not
alter the sentencing authority available to tribal courts.2 19 While SAVE
provides some increased sentencing to federal courts, these increases will
not meaningfully alter the position most Native women and Indian nations
face with respect to gender violence. Without a change to tribal sentencing,
any extension of tribal sovereignty will be less effective to combat gender
violence in Indian Country because the sentencing available sends a
permissive signal to would-be criminals.
Increasing tribal authority over sentencing increases a tribe's ability to
deter future crimes and provides proportional treatment for similar
offenses. 22 0 Without this, much of the integrity of the criminal system in
Indian Country is lost. If a tribal court cannot adequately punish offenses,
then enforcement of those offenses will not be taken seriously, directly
undermining the tribal government's sovereign authority.
I. Double Jeopardy
SAVE would create a situation where a non-Indian defendant can be
tried and incarcerated by an Indian nation, and upon release, that same
defendant could be tried and incarcerated by the federal government. This
is truly a concern that ought to be addressed fully, but there are de facto
barriers to the scenario unfolding this way. First, federal prosecutors
presently refuse to prosecute most non-Indians that commit crimes against
Indians.22 1 So, why would they be more willing to prosecute them now that
the non-Indian can be prosecuted by an Indian nation?
Additionally, SAVE provides habeas relief to defendants:
A person who has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in a
court of the United States under section 203 may petition that
court to stay further detention of that person by the participating
tribe. (2) Grant of stay. A court shall grant a stay described in
paragraph (1) if the court (A) finds that there is a substantial
likelihood that the habeas corpus petition will be granted; and
(B) after giving each alleged victim in the matter an opportunity
to be heard, finds, by clear and convincing evidence that, under
conditions imposed by the court, the petitioner is not likely to
218. Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302(7) (2006).
219. See generally S. 1763, 112th Cong.
220. See Hart, supra note 96, at 178.
221. SMITH, CONQUEST, supra note 7, at 32.
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flee or pose a danger to any person or the community if
released.222
Not only would this relief prevent double jeopardy, but it could also
exonerate a non-Indian defendant entirely. If a court were to grant a stay, it
would then be up to the federal prosecutors to charge that particular
individual. Given federal prosecutors' proclivity for not charging non-
Indians for crimes committed against Indians, then upon a successful
petition for habeas corpus, the grant of a stay would effectively become an
exoneration of the charges.
J. Prosecuting Sterilization Abuse
The phrase "better dead than pregnant" exemplifies the belief
undergirding the population-control policies implemented at the end of the
Second World War.223 The reasons for population control are varied,
including environmental, economic, and social concerns. 22 4 "In particular,
Native women, whose ability to reproduce continues to stand in the way of
the continuing conquest of Native lands, endangering the continued success
of colonization." 2 2 5
Reacting to this perception, the Indian Health Services ("IHS") began "a
fully federally funded sterilization campaign in 1970.",226 IHS doctors
routinely performed sterilization procedures without the Indian women's
227consent. Moreover, Indian women faced twice the likelihood of
sterilization as compared to white women.22 8 Given the diminished
sovereignty of Native nations, little could be done to reverse the trend. Not
only was the federal government funding these procedures, it also held
exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute the doctors committing these crimes
- 229against these indigenous women.
The SAVE Native Women Act could be the legislation necessary to end
and prevent attacks against Indian women's wombs. SAVE provides
participating tribes with special domestic violence jurisdiction in
concurrence with the federal government.23 0 It permits the exercise of
222. S. 1763, 112th Cong. sec. 201, § 204(f).
223. SMITH, CONQUEST, supra note 7, at 80-8 1.
224. Id. at 79.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 81.
227. Id. at 83.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 96-98.




jurisdiction over perpetrators of dating or domestic violence.231' This is a
narrow grant of jurisdiction, primarily aimed at a partner of the victim.232
But SAVE also permits the tribe to prosecute persons whose conduct
violates a protective order.233
Protective orders issued under this act would likely still be subject to
jurisdictional limitations created under VAWA regarding the enforcement
of protective orders.234 Depending on the specificity accorded any given
protective order, tribes could use this portion of SAVE to prevent doctors
from nonconsensual sterilizations. The tribe would need to issue a
protective order against specific doctors known to sterilize women without
their consent. If the doctor chooses to proceed with the illegal
sterilizations, then the tribe would have jurisdiction to prosecute that doctor
for violating the protective order. This would require compliance with the
above-stated elements, of course.
V. Questions That Arise from the Save Native Women Act
A. How Does Concurrent Jurisdiction Affect Tribal Prosecution?
Will concurrent jurisdiction alter prosecution in tribal courts? This is
definitely a question that arises with the enactment of SAVE. The problem
today is that the sovereign with sole jurisdiction generally has its own
community and citizenry to worry about, so grants of resources and power
to another sovereign will not have high priority. And in this instance,
whether the federal government will increase enforcement and prosecution
in response to SAVE is unknown. Likely, Congress will welcome any
decreased reliance on federal authorities due to federal authorities'
purported desire for tribal self-determination and prosecution of these
crimes.235
The SAVE Native Women Act responds, in part, to Department of
Justice requests to share jurisdiction with tribal courts. Despite recent
allocations of federal resources to Department of Justice operations in
231. Id. sec. 201, § 204(c)(1).
232. See id. sec. 201, § 204(a) (defining the types of relations that fall under the grant of
special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction).
233. Id. sec. 201, § 204(c)(2).
234. See id. sec. 202, 18 U.S.C. § 2265(e) ("...a court of an Indian tribe shall have full
civil jurisdiction to issue and enforce protection orders involving any person... in matters
arising anywhere in the Indian country of the Indian tribe or otherwise within the authority
of the Indian tribe.").
235. Perrelli Statement, supra note 1 ("Tribal governments - police, prosecutors and
courts - should be essential parts of the response to these crimes.").
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Indian Country, the incidents of violent crime wholly outnumber the
resources available to combat them.2 36 Concurrent jurisdiction permits
tribal resources and manpower to be expended in addition to the federal
resources, helping to ensure greater prosecution and conviction rates.
Concurrent jurisdiction could also expand trust responsibilities, discussed
infra.
B. Will Jurisdictional Expansion Address the Root Causes of Gender
Violence on the Reservation?
In a word, "no." Addressing the problems caused by gender violence
does necessitate expanding tribal jurisdiction over these types of crimes.
But gender violence does not emanate from within Indian societies solely as
a result of a lack of criminal jurisdiction. The prevalence of gender
violence in Indian Country is closely tied to the normalization of colonial
* - 237violence against native people, particularly native women.
That being said, expansion of criminal jurisdiction over the crime of rape
is absolutely necessary:
Department of Justice representatives have informally reported
that U.S. attorneys decline to prosecute about 75 percent of all
cases involving any crime in Indian country. U.S. attorneys are
particularly reluctant to prosecute rape cases; indeed, the
Department of Justice reported in 1997 that only two U.S.
238attorneys regularly prosecute rape cases in Indian country.
There needs to be a more concerted effort to prosecute these crimes.
SAVE's jurisdictional expansion authorizes tribal governments to up the
ante on prosecutions against domestic violence perpetrators. Unlike the
TLOA, however, SAVE does not create additional federal obligations for
prosecutions. Ideally, SAVE's emphasis on tribal attempts to prosecute
would create a rigorous and autonomous tribal judiciary.
The underlying problem, though, remains unaddressed - continued
adherence to the logic of genocide:
[N]ative peoples are entrapped in a logic of genocidal
appropriation. This logic holds that Indigenous peoples must
disappear. In fact, they must always be disappearing, in order to
236. Id.
237. SMITH, CONQUEST, supra note 7, at 8-10, 178. See generally Smith, Queer Theory,
supra note 72.




allow non-Indigenous people's rightful claim over this land.
Through this logic of genocide, non-Native people then become
the rightful inheritors of all that was Indigenous - land,
resources, Indigenous spirituality, or culture.239
The consequences for Native women are far worse than disappearing. It
means that their uteruses become a target for destruction by the dominant
society. "[I]t is because of a Native American woman's sex that she is
hunted down and slaughtered, in fact, singled out, because she has the
potential through childbirth to assure the continuance of the people." 2 40
Colonial logic prevails in white American society. This logic is
highlighted with reference to the national embrace of miscegenation
between Indian women and white men.
Under the logics of patriarchy and white supremacy, when a
Native woman reproduces with a white man the child of this
union becomes a white inheritor of the land. The child, although
racially half Native, through white supremacy and patriarchy
becomes white, since inheritance under patriarchy is passed on
through the father. Indigeneity, unlike blackness, is erased
through miscegenation with whiteness, since colonizing logic
stipulates that Native people need to disappear for the settlers to
inherit the land.24'
Without addressing these underlying cultural mores that seek, through
any means, to appropriate Indian lands, it will be impossible to effectively
remedy the problem of gender violence in Indian Country. There will
always remain a great incentive to rape the people to gain access to the land
that no extension of jurisdiction will be able to guard against the onslaught
of colonizers.
C. Does the Requirement ofAttorney General Approval for Special
Domestic Violence Jurisdiction Undermine the Goal of the Bill?
The required Attorney General approval for special domestic violence
jurisdiction provides two levels of uncertainty: 1) will the tribe have the
political wherewithal to ask for the special domestic violence jurisdiction;
and 2) will the Attorney General approve the request if made? It is
understandable that the federal government would be hesitant to share
239. Smith, Queer Theory, supra note 72, at 50.
240. SMITH, CONQUEST, supra note 7, at 79.
241. Finley, supra note 61, at 35-36.
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criminal jurisdiction with another sovereign if that other sovereign refused
to comply with the norms of U.S. criminal prosecutions. But this is another
form of colonization and paternalism.
Presumptions about the superiority of the U.S. legal system are
undergirded by an exceptionalist attitude about American culture that
effectively blinds one to atrocities committed by the American legal
system. Despite this, the rubric implemented by the Attorney General to
assess tribal grant requests mandates that each tribe give a pro forma
acknowledgment to U.S. notions of justice.242 Contrast this with tribal
notions of justice:
Law must not be confused with justice. Laws may be followed
to the letter, but that does not mean justice has been done.
Tribes are interested in a holistic, universal, larger sense of
justice . . . . The goals of the tribal court are to protect heritage,
tradition, culture, religion, and family tribal members, as well as
those who may be visiting or who are passing through tribal
territories.24 3
This discrepancy between notions of justice leads to animosity between
the different cultures. The U.S. legal system embodies its goals for justice
throughout the Constitution with a focus on defendant's rights and orderly,
peaceful procedure. 2 44 However, these goals are consistently contradicted
by general U.S. policies such as tolerance for domestic violence in military
homes.245 With this in mind, it is not difficult to understand how divergent
indigenous notions of justice may be, and with this divergence,
misunderstanding and animosity may follow.
If the Attorney General cannot reconcile indigenous values with his or
her own, his or her position of power can be used to eliminate those
indigenous values. The power dynamic is entirely one sided and does a
disservice to the idea of "inherent powers." This portion of SAVE cuts
against the notion that Congress truly affirms and recognizes the inherent
242. See S. 1763, 112th Cong. sec. 201, § 204(e)(3) (2011) (attaching conditions of
Constitutionality to Congress' recognition and affirmation of a tribes inherent power to
exercise special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction).
243. Rudy Al James, Traditional Native Justice: Restoration And Balance, Not
"Punishment", in UNLEARNING THE LANGUAGE OF CONQUEST: SCHOLARS EXPOSE ANTI-
INDIANISM IN AMERICA 108, 114 (Wahinkpe Topa (Four Arrows) ed., 2006).
244. See U.S. CONST. amend. V, VI, VIII.




power of Indian nations to prosecute gender violence crimes of non-Indians
committed against Indian people in Indian Country.
SAVE's special domestic violence jurisdiction section uses the language
traditionally reserved for power delegations that would be constrained by
constitutional principles. 2 46 Typically, an affirmation of inherent powers is
effected through Congress's plenary power and is therefore unconstrained
by constitutional principles.247 This portion of SAVE would be
unnecessary if interpreted as a true affirmation and recognition of tribal
inherent power to prosecute non-Indians for gender violence and related
crimes.
D. Delegated or Inherent Jurisdiction?
SAVE likely affirms the inherent sovereignty of tribes over some
criminal defendants. Delegated jurisdiction is jurisdiction granted to Indian
nations by Congress, whereas inherent jurisdiction is jurisdiction held by
Indian nations from time immemorial.248 As when Congress enacted the
"Duro fix" to address the problems associated with the Supreme Court's
decision in Duro v. Reina, SAVE seeks similarly to fix problems associated
with decisions like Martinez v. Martinez. It likely follows that SAVE may
experience a similar path as the Duro legislation. Litigation ensued and
each side fought all the way up to the Supreme Court on the issue of
whether Congress can restore a tribe's inherent authority to exercise
criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians. Therefore, litigation will
likely ensue as it did in Lara, but this time on the issue of a tribe's inherent
authority to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. Whether the
final outcome on this bill will mirror the "Duro fix," however, remains to be
seen.
This is a pivotal issue for the bill. If the bill is interpreted as a
reaffirmation of a tribe's inherent power to exercise criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians, then SAVE is a direct, albeit narrow, reversal of
Oliphant. Reaffirming inherent sovereignty can be straightforward.
"Congress need only definitively state its desire to reaffirm the inherent
tribal sovereign power of criminal jurisdiction over all crimes arising on the
246. See S. 1763, 112th Cong. sec. 201, § 204(e)(3) (requiring tribes to abide by the U.S.
Constitution in exchange "for Congress to recognize and affinn the inherent power of the
participating tribe to exercise criminal jurisdiction over the defendant" pursuant to SAVE).
247. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200-02 (2004).
248. COHEN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 4.01(l)(a) (Nell Jessup Newton et
al. eds., LexisNexis 2005).
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reservation, regardless of the perpetrator."2 49  But if a court interprets
SAVE's language as delegating criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, then
SAVE merely complies with Oliphant, which mandated that Congress
create a tribe's ability to exercise criminal jurisdiction over a non-Indian.250
Although both principles require legislation, the former requires more
precise language.25 1
This bill has language that the judiciary will need to interpret. The
granting language states the scope of tribal jurisdiction as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in addition to all
powers of self-government recognized and affirmed by this Act,
the powers of self-government of a participating tribe include the
inherent power of that tribe, which is hereby recognized and
affirmed, to exercise special domestic violence criminal
jurisdiction over all persons.252
The bill's writers indicate their intent to recognize that an inherent
power, rather than a delegation from Congress, lies at the heart of this
legislation. First, in section 204(e)(3), the writers specifically limit the bill's
scope, by explicitly requiring the courts to provide defendants with all other
rights mandated under the Constitution of the United States.253 A
delegation of power would already entail those rights, as congressional
power is limited by the Constitution, and Congress cannot delegate power it
does not have.
Another example can be found in section 204(f)(1), where defendants
can petition for a writ of habeas corpus in a federal court if they are
detained and awaiting trial by a participating tribe.2 54 This again
demonstrates that Congress is reaffirming inherent powers because any
delegated criminal jurisdiction would automatically come with the
defendant's power to petition for habeas corpus, as per the U.S.
Constitution.255 But the inclusion of a writ for habeas corpus could also
potentially be interpreted to increase federal oversight over tribal
judiciaries.
249. Ennis, supra note 186, at 573.
250. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978).
251. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004).
252. S. 1763, 112th Cong. sec. 201, § 204(b)(1) (2011).
253. Id. sec. 201, § 204(e)(3).
254. Id. sec. 201, § 204(f)(1).




Some might say that without direct language reaffirming an inherent
power, SAVE must be considered a delegation of power. The limitations
aforementioned might be mere formality. But this seems unlikely, given
that SAVE's text is also missing any language of delegation. Moreover,
SAVE specifically addresses concurrent jurisdiction, signifying that no
power has been delegated (i.e. transferred) from the federal government to
256thtribal governments. Rather, the federal government maintains its power,
while simultaneously recognizing the inherent power of Indian sovereigns
to police criminal conduct.2 57
Section 204(d) provides numerous ways for a defendant to move for
dismissal.2 58 Most importantly are the motions to dismiss based on 1) non-
Indian status or 2) a "lack [of] sufficient ties to the Indian tribe."259 The
first cause for dismissal likely addresses a congressional desire to leave
non-Indian on non-Indian crime within the domain of states. Whether the
power is delegated or inherent, a court could decide either way on the
dismissal motion. This dismissal avenue severely narrows a tribe's exercise
of jurisdiction.
The second cause for dismissal supports the proposition that SAVE
reaffirms inherent sovereignty. Inherent sovereignty cannot extend beyond
the physical reach of any sovereign. The "ties to the tribe" exception
reinforces this notion and is a logical limitation on jurisdiction. If a federal
court cannot establish a real connection to a defendant, then it cannot
exercise jurisdiction over that particular defendant. 2 60 Such a limitation
corresponds to an expression of inherent sovereignty because a delegated
power might permit further reach of the jurisdiction granted to the tribe.
What is more, the "ties to the tribe" exception provides a new conceptual
limit to jurisdiction. In a light most favorable to Indian nations, this would
mean that jurisdiction would be responsive to the experience of the
community. In a light unfavorable to Indian nations, the "ties to the tribe"
would be just another way to absolve non-Indians of their criminal conduct.
Turning the Montana exceptions on their head, this exception would deny
Tribal jurisdiction over criminal conduct where a consensual relationship or
a direct effect on tribal interests is absent.26 1
256. S. 1763, 112th Cong. sec. 201, § 204(b)(2).
257. See id.
258. Id. sec. 201, § 204(d).
259. Id. sec. 201, § 204(d)(2)-(3).
260. This is a basic tenant of in personum jurisdiction.
261. See S. 1763, 112th Cong. sec. 201, § 204(d)(3); cf Montana, 450 U.S. at 546.
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VI. What Are the Alternatives?
An alternative to SAVE's approach to the problem of gender violence in
Indian Country is not easy to imagine. An executive order could accomplish
the same thing, but that method has not been tested in courts. Courts have
tested congressional affirmation of inherent powers in United States v. Lara
and found such affirmation permissible.262 Using an executive order may
accomplish the same result, but it may be tenuous, given the lack of
jurisprudential clarity on that particular method.26 3 Moreover, any such
executive order would convey merely a delegated power to an Indian
264nation.
Creating an indigenous jurisprudence of gender violence is one necessary
alternative. First, a Native American paradigm of gender violence
deconstructs the dominant Anglo-American narrative of gender relations.265
Moreover, any re-conceptualization of the law will offer an opportunity to
strengthen tribal leadership and sovereignty. Historical circumstances
enable this opportunity:
Because sexual violence has been inextricably linked to
colonization and imperialism, and has served as a means by
which to terrorize and subdue indigenous nations, then the
indigenous re-definition of rape must empower the tribal
governments to assert control over the response to rape and the
266promotion of justice on their own terms.
These terms can be best ascertained from individual Indian people and their
experiences with gender violence.
Incorporating oral tradition into Native American legal tradition proves
highly beneficial to the judiciary and empowers Native people that find
themselves before the tribe's judicial system. The example of the Navajo
courts system elucidates this point:
Although there has been criticism that the American judicial
model imports very different societal values into Navajo courts,
the existence of an independent Navajo judiciary reinfused
262. See generally United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
263. See Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 316 U.S. 317, 330 (1942) (indicating, in
reference to land grants, that executive order grants of rights and interests to Indian nations
are different and lesser than similar congressional grants).
264. See id.





traditional cultural elements into legal relationships among the
tribe and on the reservation. Because Navajo courts are free to
rely on tribal custom where there is no applicable federal law,
Navajo judges have had the opportunity over the past fifty years
to develop a "Navajo common law." 26 7
The Navajo courts provide but one successful example of Native
people's judicial independence from the American legal system. In the case
of gender violence, the same will be true. Native nations must be allowed
the latitude to develop their own legal systems to combat the issue of
Native American gender violence.
VII. Conclusion
The perils Native American women face may seem insurmountable. But
the appearance of catastrophe need not interfere with progress; rather, that
appearance ought to serve as impetus for change. Decolonizing Native
nations must entail decolonizing Native bodies, transforming the
relationship Native people maintain with their bodies. More than a call for
domestic self-government, Native American women must seek bodily
sovereignty. More than mere choice, Native people must demand realistic
access to reproductive healthcare. In the legal system, Native bodies
deserve the same dignity afforded other bodies. Native governments must
have the ability to preserve the dignity of those Native bodies.
The SAVE Native Women Act steps closer to those aspirations. SAVE
creates a network of agencies, governmental and non-governmental,
examining the problem of gender violence in Indian Country. It helps to
fund the development of tribal agencies and organizations that can deal
with the perpetrators and the victims accordingly. Tribes are now able to
better manage internal strife with the addition of full civil jurisdiction over
protective orders. SAVE also makes it possible for tribes to begin
developing their own rape law.
By leaving room for indigenous perspectives to build tribal law, a fuller
remedy for the problem of gender violence in Indian Country can be
fashioned. If Congress enacts the SAVE Native Women Act, Indian people
will finally be able to avail themselves of the same gender-violence
remedies afforded to the rest of the non-Indian population.
267. Andrew Gilden, Preserving the Seeds of Gender Fluidity: Tribal Courts and the
Berdache Tradition, 13 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 237, 257 (2007).
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